The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Brainwashing-Related Cases - Should Witnesses Be Fryed? by Fournier, Virginia M.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 32 | Number 2 Article 7
1-1-1992
The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in
Brainwashing-Related Cases - Should Witnesses Be
Fryed?
Virginia M. Fournier
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Virginia M. Fournier, Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Brainwashing-Related Cases - Should Witnesses Be Fryed?, 32
Santa Clara L. Rev. 607 (1992).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss2/7
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
BRAINWASHING-RELATED CASES-SHOULD
WITNESSES BE FRYED?
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are an attorney whose client wants to
bring an action against a religious cult for brainwashing. Your
client claims to have been falsely imprisoned, fraudulently
deceived into giving money to the cult, and subjected to emo-
tional distress. The only way that you can prove that the brain-
washing has occurred and that the cult group is subject to tort
liability is through expert testimony. But then you learn that
courts have impeached such experts for all purposes because
their views on brainwashing are not "generally accepted." Does
this leave your client with no cause of action for the
brainwashing- related tortious conduct of the religious cult?
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines brain-
washing as "a forcible indoctrination to induce someone to
give up basic political, social, or religious beliefs and attitudes
and to accept contrasting regimented ideas."' One psychology
textbook defines brainwashing as "[t]he most extreme form of
attitude change, accomplished through peer pressure, physical
suffering, threats, rewards for compliance, manipulation of
guilt, intensive indoctrination, and other psychological
means."2 Brainwashing, a word coined by journalist Edward
Hunter in 1951 to criticize thought reform in China,
3 conjures
up visions of human zombies wandering about in a trance with
their eyes rolled back and their arms held straight out in front
of them. One may also recall Korean prisoners of war, the
1. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 175 (1987). Brainwashing
has also been defined as "[ilnducing a person to modify his attitudes and behav-
ior in certain directions through various forms of pressure or torture." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DIC'IONARY 192 (5th unabr. Law. ed. 1982).
2. JAMES HASsEr, UNDERSTANDING PSYCHOLOGY 349 (3d ed. 1980).
3. ALAN N. SCHEFLIN & EDWARD M. OPTON, JR., THE MIND MANIPULATORS
22 (1978).
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Charles Manson murders, Patty Hearst and religious cults in
determining the impact of brainwashing."
In Molko v. Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of
World Christianity,' the California Supreme Court held that the
plaintiffs, who had been persuaded coercively to join the
Church,6 could maintain a cause of action against the Church
for fraud and deceit as well as intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress in connection with their brainwashing claims."
While a church is generally immune from tort liability under
the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution,8 the Molko court stat-
ed that "[t]he religion clauses protect only claims rooted in re-
ligious belief,"9 and "while religious belief is absolutely pro-
tected, religiously motivated conduct is not."" The court went
on to state that religiously motivated conduct "'remains subject
to regulation for the protection of society.."" In other words,
religious belief and religiously-motivated conduct could be
bifurcated, and the Church would not necessarily be immune
from all tort liability related to its religiously-motivated con-
duct based on its First Amendment rights. This is important
because if the Church were immune from all tort liability un-
der the First Amendment, then the plaintiffs would have no
4. Id. at 23.
5. 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988). The Unification Church will be referred to here-
inafter as the "Church."
6. See infra notes 36-81 and accompanying text.
7. Molko, 762 P.2d at 67. See a1so Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 260
Cal. Rptr. 331 (Ct. App. 1989). In Wollenheim, the plaintiff was awarded $500,000
in compensatory damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages for his claim
against the Church of Scientology for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id. at 355.
8. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme
Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incor-
porates the rights set forth in the First Amendment because such rights are "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325(1937), and "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Accordingly, states may not interfere with an
individual's freedom of speech or exercise of religion.
9. Molko, 762 P.2d at 56 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972)).
10. Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963)).
11. Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940)).
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cause of action against the Church. Since the Molko court held
that such immunity was only partial (with respect to religious
conduct only), then the plaintiffs were able to proceed with a
cause of action against the Church for non-religious conduct,
and could present evidence to demonstrate that brainwashing
had occurred.
The Molko court recognized that the plaintiffs' causes of
action did involve an element of brainwashing, and held that
they should be given an opportunity to present evidence to
support their claims.12 However, in a recent United States
District Court case, United States v. Fishman,"
5 the court held
that the evidence required to support such an element of
brainwashing was not admissible, since certain views of brain-
washing are not generally accepted by the scientific communi-
ty. 4 The primary problem that the Fishman opinion pres-
ents"' is that the court essentially negates the cause of action
established by Molko by holding that expert testimony on
brainwashing is inadmissible. If brainwashing
6 cannot be
proven by means of expert testimony, which is the only way
that brainwashing can be proven, then the plaintiffs cause of
action must necessarily fail. It is important that expert testimo-
ny concerning brainwashing be deemed admissible so that
plaintiffs with Molko-type claims can obtain relief against a
defendant such as the Church. Otherwise, defendants such as
12. Id. at 61.
13. 743 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
14. Id. at 723. That court applied the standard set forth in Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
15. It is acknowledged that the Fishman case is not binding precedent for the
California Supreme Court or any other California court. However, the Fishman
case has far-reaching ramifications and presents serious issues with respect to any
plaintiff's assertion of a brainwashing-related cause of action or defense. See infra
note 145 and accompanying text.
16. The terms "brainwashing," "mind control," and "coercive persuasion" will
be used interchangeably in this comment, although some commentators view brain-
washing to be at the extreme right end on the continuum of influence, with mind
control and coercive persuasion a few notches to the left. According to these
commentators, completely independent thought would be to the extreme left of
the spectrum, and high-pressure sales would be a few notches to the right. See
Fishman, 743 F. Supp. at 717 (where the court discusses the teachings of ROBERT
J. LIFrON, M.D., THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM-A STUDY
OF "BRAINWASHING" IN CHINA (1963) and EDGAR H. SCHEIN, COERCIVE PERSUA-
SION-A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE "BRAINWASHING" OF AMERICAN
CIVILIAN PRISONERS BY THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS (1961)).
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the Church in Molko would be rendered immune from liability
for brainwashing-related torts such as fraud, deceit, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and retribution, since the plain-
tiffs could not successfully sue such defendants.
This comment addresses the future admissibility of expert
testimony in brainwashing-related cases in light of the Fishman
decision. First, the comment discusses mind control and how it
works. 7 Next, the comment examines applicable case law al-
lowing causes of action in coercive persuasion situations. 8
The comment discusses the standards for the admission of
expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
related case law, 9 and then addresses the proof problem that
Fishman and the application of the Frye standard present.2,
Section III of the comment analyzes the applicability of the
Frye rule to expert testimony relating to brainwashing and
suggests potential alternative tests which may be more appro-
priate." Finally, Section IV proposes a new standard which
will ensure that expert testimony continues to meet the stan-
dards mandated by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, while at the
same time allowing the plaintiff to maintain a cause of action
in coercive persuasion cases.2
II. BRAINWASHING AND THE PROOF PROBLEM
A. Brainwashing
The modern history of coercive persuasion began in the
1950's, during the Korean conflict, although coercive persua-
sion has probably existed for at least several hundred years."
In 1951, Edward Hunter presented his theory about the "brain-
washing" of Americans held as prisoners of war in Korea.
17. See infra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 33-106 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 107-25 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 126-61 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 146-88 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 189-214 and accompanying text.
23. SCHEFLIN & OPTON, supra note 3, at 90 (quoting 0. John Rogge, former
Assistant U.S. Attorney General). The use of coercive persuasion can be traced
back from the Koreans through the Chinese, the Soviets, the czars, the French,
and finally to the church. In fact, "[t]he origin of the inquisitional technique goes
back more than 700 years to some decretals of Innocent III." SCHEFLIN & OPTON,
supra note 3, at 90.
24. United States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713, 716 (citing EDWARD HUNTER,
[Vol. 32
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Hunter believed that the scientific theories of Ivan Pavlov, a
Russian neurophysiologist, were at the foundation of brain-
washing. 5 Hunter claimed that communists were using brain-
washing to convert people to their way of thinking and be-
lieved that the intent of this form of mind control was ex-
treme; in his words the purpose of brainwashing was "to atom-
ize Humanity.""
By the time Hunter had written his second book, the con-
cept of brainwashing was becoming accepted by the American
public and had become a household word.
7 Many psycholo-
gists, psychiatrists and medical specialists began to hypothesize
about brainwashing and, as a result, a number of controversial
theories surfaced. 8 Robert Lifton and Edgar Schein, two
highly-respected authorities in this field, believe that brainwash-
ing is both possible and extremely effective." Another group
of commentators believes that brainwashing is nonexistent or
ineffective," while yet another group believes that persuasion
alone is not enough and must be combined with aggression or
BRAINWASHING IN RED CHINA: THE CALCULATED DESTRUCTION OF MEN'S MINDS
(1953)).
25. SCHEFLIN & OPTON, supra note 3, at 86. Ivan Pavlov, a Russian physiolo-
gist and Nobel Prize winner, conducted a number of famous experiments on
dogs. In one familiar experiment, Pavlov struck a tuning fork immediately before
giving food to a dog. The dog would naturally begin to salivate as soon as it saw
the food, but eventually, as it began to associate the sound of the tuning fork
with the appearance of food, the dog would begin to salivate upon hearing the
tuning fork, even in the absence of food. JAMES HASSETT, UNDERSTANDING PSY-
CHOLOGY 13-14 (3d ed. 1980). This "conditioned reflex," a stimulus eliciting a
desired response which is different from what the usual response would have been
(e.g., dogs, absent conditioning, would not salivate at the sound of a tuning fork)
became known as "classical conditioning." Id. at 24.
26. SCHEFLIN & OPTON, supra note 3, at 87.
27. EDWARD HUNTER, BRAINWASHING: THE STORY OF MEN WHO DEFIED IT
(1956).
28. Some of the more colorful descriptions of brainwashing are "menticide,"
"brain warfare," and "mental douche." SCHEFLIN & OPTON, supra note 3, at 87.
29. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 762
P.2d 46, 54 (Cal. 1988). See, e.g., ROBERT J. LITON M.D., THOUGHT REFORM AND
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM-A STUDY OF "BRAINWASHING" IN CHINA (1963)
and EDGAR H. SCHEIN, COERCIVE PERSUASION-A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE "BRAINWASHING" OF AMERICAN CIVILIAN PRISONERS BY THE CHINESE COM-
MUNISTS (1961).
30. Molko, 762 P.2d at 55 (citing LEE COLEMAN, M.D., New Religions and the
Myth of Mind Control, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 322, 323 (1984)).
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violence, "otherwise any successful attempt at persuasion, such
as education or advertising, would be brainwashing.""'
Albert Somit borrows from a variety of sources to estab-
lish what he views as nine elements which are necessary in the
brainwashing process. They are: (1) identification with the
inquisitor, (2) impairment of one's mental ability through fa-
tigue and hunger so that the subject is not strong enough to
resist, (3) disorientation and "stimulus hunger" resulting from
solitary confinement, (4) suggestion, (5) repetition, (6) guilt
which may be manipulated to exact confession and compli-
ance, (7) ego destruction through humiliation, degradation and
self-betrayal-again, one is not strong enough to resist, (8) non-
rational behavior in the face of sudden stimulus, and (9) alter-
nation of fear (of pain-psychological and/or physical) and
hope (i.e., relief from the pain)."
Brainwashing appears to have been used for some time,
and there seem to be a variety of views on the subject. Howev-
er, one common element of the theories of those believing
that brainwashing is possible is that a person's mind is taken
hostage by another who then exercises control over the "weak-
er" individual.
B. Cause of Action Allowed in Brainwashing-Related Cases: Molko
v. Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity
More recently, some courts and commentators have
agreed that certain religious cults may be employing brain-
washing initially to "recruit" members and then to control
them." In a 1988 decision, Molko v. Holy Spirit Association for
31. SCHEFLIN & OPToN, supra note 3, at 86.
32. SCHEFLIN & OPTON, supra note 3, at 93-94. Most of the controversy with
respect to brainwashing seems to center around element number nine and wheth-
er physical pain is necessary for brainwashing to be effective. See infra notes
126-42 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 589 F. Supp. 10 (D.
Mass. 1983); Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D. R.I. 1978), affid
per curiam, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288 (8th
Cir. 1981); Schuppin v. Unification Church, 435 F. Supp. 603 (D. Vt. 1977), aff'd,
573 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1977); Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of
World Christianity, 746 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988); Katz v. Superior Court, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 234 (Ct. App. 1977); Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn.
1981), crt. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981); Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unifica-
tion, 480 N.Y.S. 2d 706, 710 (N.Y. Sup. 1984), order rev'4 506 N.Y.S. 2d 174
(N.Y.A.D. 1986), dismissal granted, 69 N.Y.2d 742 (N.Y. 1987); Richard Delgado,
[Vol. 32
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the Unifcation of World Christianity,3 the California Supreme
Court held that the brainwashing theory of the plaintiffs, David
Molko and Tracy Leal, did present a question of fact in their
claim against the Church for fraud and deceit as well as inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, thus precluding a grant
of summary judgment in favor of the Church."5
1. The Case of David Molko
The facts of Molko seem to be typical of those cases in-
volving coercive religious cults.' David Molko had just gradu-
ated in June of 1978 from Temple University School of Law,
and passed the Pennsylvania bar examination.
7 As David was
unsure about his future, he decided to visit San Francisco."
While David was in San Francisco in January of 1979, Mark
Bush and Ernest Patton, members of the Church,
9 ap-
proached him at a bus stop. ° The Members told David that
they belonged to an "international community" of socially
conscious individuals, and that the community held discussion
groups in the evenings." The Members invited David to come
to dinner that evening.4 David asked the Members if they had
a "religious connection" and they replied that they did 
not.43
David attended the dinner, along with guests who had
been invited by other Members." However, he was isolated
Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First Amendment, 51 S.
CAL. L REV. 1, 3-9 (1977); A. JAMES RUDIN & MARCIA R. RUDIN, PRISON OR
PARADISE? THE NEW RELIGIOUS CULTS 20-25 (1980).
34. 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988).
35. Id. at 67. By allowing the causes of action, the court implicitly recognized
that brainwashing does occur.
36. See, e.g., MARC GALANTER, CULTS, FAITH, HEALING, AND COERCION 133-44
(1989).
37. Molho, 762 P.2d at 49-50.
38. Id.
39. Bush and Patton, collectively with the other members of the Unification
Church, will hereinafter be referred to as the "Members."
40. Molko, 762 P.2d at 50.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. "Workshop" guests of the Church are typically single, white, with an
average age of 22. GALANTER, supra note 36, at 140. They are also typically indi-
viduals who feel a higher level of emotional distress and social alienation than the
average person. GALANTER, supra note 36, at 141-42. See, e.g., Wollersheim v.
Church of Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331, 335 (Ct. App. 1989) (plaintiff was "an
1992]
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from other invited guests and was kept occupied by the Mem-
bers.4 After dinner, David attended a lecture and then a slide
show describing "Boonville," a "farm" where the Members
went to relax.4" After the slide show, David was invited to go
to Boonville, and after much encouragement by the Members,
he agreed to go.47 At this point, he was still unaware that the
Members were affiliated with the Church, and that Boonville
was an "indoctrination facility" for the Church.48
David arrived at Boonville several hours later.49 He fell
asleep and woke the next day with many other "guests."'
Once at the farm, a Member accompanied him at all times, no
matter what he did or where he went.5' Expecting to be able
to relax, David was surprised to learn of the day's rigorous
schedule which included calisthenics twice a day, lectures, and
discussions. 2 David was never left alone and was always in-
volved in some activity with the Members.
Each day at Boonville was as strenuous, and David began
to feel "tired, uncomfortable and concerned about the direc-
tion his life was taking."' He told the Members that he want-
ed to return to San Francisco, but he was urged to stay.5 Af-
ter a week at the farm, the Members told David that they were
about to leave for "Camp K," a weekend retreat.' David was
hesitant to go, but after another round of encouragement he
agreed to make the trip. 7 At this time, David was still un-
aware of the Members' and his connection with the Church."
incipient manic-depressive for most of his life"). One tactic that the Church uses
on these distressed individuals is to shower them with positive attention so that
they will feel better about themselves and want to remain with the cult. This has
been referred to as "love-bombing." GALANTER, supra note 36, at 134-35.
45. Moiko, 762 P.2d at 50.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 50-51.
56. Id. at 51.
57. Id.
58. Id. The Church uses two types of induction: open entry and induction by
deception. Under open entry induction, used in the northeastern United States
614 (Vol. 32
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The schedule at Camp K was no less rigorous than that at
Boonville. David became more confused and despairing. After
almost two weeks of calisthenics, lectures (some of which were
repeated verbatim) and group discussions, David again in-
quired as to whether the group was affiliated with a religious
organization." One of the Members finally confirmed David's
fears and told him that, in fact, the group was part of the Uni-
fication Church.' David felt "confused and angry," and was
told that deception was necessary to increase receptivity.6' He
was also convinced to remain with the group to "try to work
out his confusion." 62
David remained at Camp K for "advanced training" which
lasted several weeks."' His parents became concerned and
traveled from Florida to urge him to return home.' David
refused to go as, by that time, the Members had convinced
him that "his parents were agents of Satan trying to tempt him
away from the Church."' After his training, David was al-
lowed to go to San Francisco to recruit new members." He
also became a Member himself, and was urged to give the
Church money for its taxes. 7
and Southern California, recruits are made fully aware that the activities in which
they are participating are associated with the Church. In the San Francisco Bay
area, the induction by deception method is more common, and "[p]otential mem-
bers [are] approached under the guise of introducing them to an innocuous so-
cially oriented group and only when the potential recruits became fully involved
in the group [are] they made aware of its association with the church." GALANTER,
supra note 36, at 133. It appears that sect leaders are reluctant to identify the
affiliation with the Church until after recruits are "hooked" for fear of scaring off
potential members. GALANTER, supra note 36, at 135.
59. Molko, 762 P.2d at 51.
60. Id.
61. 1d. See also supra note 58.
62. Molko, 762 P.2d at 51.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. David Molko's experience with the Moonies, see infra note 75, is not
unlike those of other religious cults. See, e.g., Wollersheim v. Church of
Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331 (Ct. App. 1989), where plaintiff was persuaded,
against his objections, to recruit members aboard a Scientology ship. The daily
routine aboard the ship was very strenuous; the day began at 6:00 a.m. and did
not end until 1:00 a.m. Plaintiff and others had to sleep in extremely cramped
quarters. Plaintiff lost 15 pounds in his six-week stay on the ship. He tried to
escape from the ship because he was afraid of dying and losing his mind, and he
was captured by other Scientology members who coerced him into staying aboard
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The Members persuaded David to take the California bar
examination so that he could help the Church.' As David left
the examination, he was abducted by "deprogrammers" whom
his parents had hired.69 David relinquished his membership
with the Church after three days of "deprogramming" in a
motel room."
2. The Case of Tracy Leal
Tracy Leal had an experience similar to that of David
Molko. While Tracy was in San Francisco waiting for a bus to
Humboldt, she was approached by a Member.7 She was invit-
ed to dinner and attended the same type of lecture and slide
show on Boonville as David had.72 She endured the same rig-
orous routine of twice-a-day. calisthenics, lectures and discus-
sions." Tracy also went to Camp K, and experienced doubts
and fears similar to David's.74 She inquired as to whether the
Members were "Moonies,"75 and they said they were not.76
the ship. Wollersheim was later encouraged to "disconnect" from (i.e., have no fur-
ther contact with) his family since they had shown concern over plaintiff's con-
tinued membership. Id. at 334-35.
68. Molko, 762 P.2d at 51.
69. Id.
70. Id. "Deprogramming" involves using physical restraint to "dislodge a mem-
ber from one of these zealous groups." GALANTER, supra note 36, at 166. The re-
straint involved can range from observation by parents at home to physical abuse
by strangers in unfamiliar settings. GALANTER, supra note 36, at 166-72. "Depro-
grammers" are generally hired to kidnap and psychologically "recapture" individu-
als who have been brainwashed by religious cults. Some commentators believe that
"deprogramming" has risen to the level of becoming a new vocation. Frequently,
"deprogrammers" are people who have failed as cult members themselves. Some-
times the religious cults even accuse the "deprogrammers" of brainwashing.
SCHEFLIN & OPTON, supra note 3, at 52-53. See also GALANTER, supra note 36, at
166-72. Generally, deprogrammers will expose the cult member to negative infor-
mation about the religious sect with which he or she is involved, and explain the
principles of brainwashing with the intent that the cult member will come to a
realization about his or her treatment by the cult. GALANTER, supra note 36, at
168-69.
71. Molko, 762 P.2d at 51-52.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The Unification Church follows the teachings of the Reverend Sun Myung
Moon and the members are sometimes pejoratively referred to as "Moonies."
SCHEFUN & OPrON, supra note 3, at 52-53.
Reverend Moon, a self-ordained minister, began his religious sect in the
mid-1950s in South Korea. Moon arrived in the United States around 1972. The
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After Tracy had been with the Members for twenty-two days,
they admitted that they were part of the Unification Church."
Tracy stayed with the Members even after learning that
they were "Moonies. " " After being with the Members for
three months, Tracy became a formal Member of the Church
and flew to Colorado for a one-month series of lectures.' She
then went to Los Angeles to raise funds for the Church by
selling flowers.' In Los Angeles, deprogrammers hired by'
Tracy's parents abducted her and convinced her to relinquish
her membership and involvement with the Church.8
3. Causes of Action Upheld
The California Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Mosk, held that David Molko could maintain causes of
action for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and restitution of the $6,000 "gift" he had given to the Church
for payment of its taxes.8" The court also held that Tracy Leal
could maintain causes of action for fraud and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress."
The Church argued that under the Free Exercise Clauses
of both the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 4 of the California Constitution, the
United States, unlike Japan and Korea where the cult was already in existence,
was conducive to formation of the religious sect due to the protection afforded by
the First Amendment. Moon maintains that "[firom childhood I was clairvoyant. I
could see through people, see their spirits." He claims to have met with both Mo-
ses and Buddha. The elaborate religious beliefs of the sect are set forth in the
Divine Principle, which is Moon's interpretation of the Old and New Testaments
and which is entirely inconsistent with American Christianity. Moon's religious
beliefs also involve an element of anti-Communism. In 1985, Moon spent 11
months in federal prison for filing false tax returns. The Unification Church is
notable for its mass engagements and marriage ceremonies, where over 4,000
members would be engaged and later wed en masse (up to three years later with
cohabitation and sexual relations prohibited in the interim). GALANTER, supra note
36, at 129-66.
76. Molko, 762 P.2d at 51-52.
77. Id.
78. I. at 52.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 67.
83. Id. The Molko and Leal actions were consolidated by the California Court
of Appeal. Id. at 49.
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former Members (Molko and Leal) could not bring a cause of
action against it.' The court of appeal agreed, and did not
allow the actions imposing tort liability under a false im-
prisonment theory."5 The California Supreme Court conceded
that Tracy Leal's false imprisonment claim could not survive
constitutional scrutiny since the claim was based solely on di-
vine retribution," which is viewed as a form of free speech
and expression of religious belief.87 Tracy Leal believed that
she could not leave the Members or the Church or else her
family "would be damned in Hell forever and they would for-
ever feel sorry for having blown their one chance to unite with
the Messiah and make it to Heaven. " '8 The court held that
"such threats are protected religious speech and cannot pro-
vide the basis for tort liability.""9
84. Id. at 48.
85. Id. at 64.
86. Divine retribution is the Church's form of punishment, and usually in-
volves threats of going to Hell. Divine retribution is held to be a protected form
of religious speech, and cannot be the basis for a false imprisonment claim. Id.
See also Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953); Van Schaick v. Church of
Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1139 (D. Mass. 1982). But see
Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331, 341-43 (Ct. App. 1989)
(Church retributive conduct, although central to Church practices, is not protected
by the Constitution).
87. Molko, 762 P.2d at 64.
88. Id.
89." Id. at 64 (citations omitted). False imprisonment is defined as "the unlaw-
ful violation of the personal liberty of another," and "the nonconsensual, inten-
tional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable length
of time, however short." Id. at 63 (citations omitted). An additional element often
included in the false imprisonment prima facie case is that there can be no rea-
sonable means of escape. WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 39 (7th ed. 1982).
Perhaps if Tracy Leal had asserted that there was no reasonable means of
escape from either Boonville or Camp K because she was always accompanied by
a Member, and because there was no transportation other than the Church bus,
the cause of action for false imprisonment would have been stronger, since it
would not have been based solely on a fear of divine retribution. See, e.g., Candy
H. v. Redemption Ranch, 563 F. Supp. 505, 510 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (plaintiff at a
Baptist girls' home could not receive communications from outside persons, was
not allowed to talk to other "new" girls or say anything bad about the home,
plaintiff's calls were monitored and her mail was censored, and plaintiff was con-
fined to the home, which was locked on both the interior and exterior).
In George v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness of Cal., 262 Cal. Rptr.
217 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991), the
California court of appeal was presented with a similar false imprisonment claim.
This opinion was ordered depublished by the California Supreme Court, 89 CDOS
6814 (1989). Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment
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With respect to the claims of fraud and deceit, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and retribution, though, the
court held that:
[N]either the federal nor state constitution barred the
plaintiffs from bringing traditional fraud actions against
the Church. These actions were based on the Church's
alleged inducement of them, by misrepresentation and
concealment of its identity, into unknowingly entering an
atmosphere in which they were then subjected to coercive
persuasion .... Because triable issues of fact existed as
to... whether Molko and Leal were, by means of coercive
persuasion, rendered unable to respond independently
upon learning that they had been deceived, the supreme
court held that the court of appeal erred in affirming the
summary judgment for the Church as to plaintiffs' actions
for fraud.'
The California Supreme Court's rationale for allowing the
causes of action for tort liability was that "while religious belief
is absolutely protected, religiously motivated conduct is not,"9'
and remanded the case to the appellate court. 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
In George, the plaintiff "recognized this was not a prototypical case of false
imprisonment. Robin [plaintiff] admitted she was never physically restrained by the
defendants and that her residence in the various Krishna temples was not against
her will." 262 Cal. Rptr. at 231. Plaintiff introduced testimony from Drs. Margaret
Singer and Sydney Smith that Robin had been brainwashed into joining the cult.
Dr. Singer testified that plaintiff's "will had been overborne" and that her decision
to run away from home and join the cult "was not a product of her own free
will." Id. at 232. Dr. Singer and Dr. Smith both testified that there were several
factors of Krishna cult dynamics which "contributed to rendering Robin incapable
of exercising freedom of choice including a low-carbohydrate vegetarian diet, re-
duced amounts of sleep and chanting as a means of religious ritual." Id.
The George court stated that it was unwilling to "extend what we believe
are the clear limits of Molko. To begin with, we read Molko as a reaffirmation that
physical force or the threat of it is a necessary element of a false imprisonment
cause of action even in the context of a brainwashing claim." Id. at 236. The
George court stated that there was no evidence that the cult had acted fraudulent-
ly, so the causes of action allowed by Molho were not applicable to this case. Id.
The court concluded that "[a]bsent such evidence [of religious fraud], Robin's
brainwashing theory of false imprisonment is no more than an attempt to premise
tort liability on religious practices .the Georges find objectionable. Such a result is
simply inconsistent with the First Amendment." Id. (alteration in original).
The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review filed by the
International Society for Krishna Consciousness. George v. Int'l Society for Krish-
na Consciousness, No. S012420 (1989 Cal. LEXIS 5078) (Cal. 1989).
90. Molko, 762 P.2d at 46.
91. Id. at 56 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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and that such religiously motivated conduct "remains subject
to regulation for the protection of society."' In other words,
the Church's actions are analyzed, and religious belief is sepa-
rated from religiously motivated conduct. Belief is absolutely
protected under the Constitution, while religiously motivated
conduct is not, and tort liability may lie for such conduct.
The court also set forth a balancing test in connection
with the regulation of such conduct, wherein "the importance
of the state's interest is weighed against the severity of the
burden imposed on religion,"9 and the government's interest
must be more compelling as the burden on religion grows.'
If government action can pass this balancing test, it must also
(1) not impose a greater burden on religion than is necessary
to satisfy the government's interest and (2) "not discriminate
between religions, or between religion and nonreligion. " '
The court added that "religious groups are not immune from
all tort liability. It is well settled, for example, that religious
groups may be held liable in tort for secular acts."' The court
acknowledged that "in appropriate cases courts will recognize
tort liability even for acts that are religiously motivated."97
In applying the balancing test, the court concluded that
the imposition of tort liability would not affect religious belief,
the burden on religion would not be substantial, and that the
marginal burden imposed on the Church's free exercise of
92. Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940)).
93. Molko, 762 P.2d at 56 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214
(1972)).
94. Molko, 762 P.2d at 56-57.
95. Id. at 57 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
96. Molko, 762 P.2d at 57.
97. Id. at 57. The court gives several examples. See, e.g., Candy H. v. Redemp.
tion Ranch, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 505, 516 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (allowing cause of action
for false imprisonment against religious group); Van Schaick v. Church of
Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1135 (D. Mass. 1982) ("[clauses of
action based upon some proscribed conduct may, thus, withstand a motion to
dismiss even if the alleged wrongdoer acts upon a religious belief or is organized
for a religious purpose."); O'Moore v. Driscoll, 28 P.2d 438, 440, (Cal. 1933) (al-
lowing priest's cause of action against his superiors for false imprisonment as part
of their effort to obtain his confession of sins); Bear v. Reformed Mennonite
Church, 341 A.2d 105, 107 (N.Y. 1975) (allowing cause of action for interference
with marriage and business interests when church ordered congregation to "shun"
former member); Carrieri v. Bush 419 P.2d 132, 137 (Wash. 1966) (allowing cause
of action for alienation of affections when pastor counseled woman to leave her
husband who was "full of the devil").
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religion was justified by the state's compelling interest in pro-
tecting "individuals and families from the substantial threat to
public safety, peace and order posed by the fraudulent induc-
tion of unconsenting individuals into an atmosphere of coer-
cive persuasion."" The court concluded that no lesser restric-
tion would satisfy the state's interest." The court similarly
determined that the conduct involved in the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress and retribution claims could be sepa-
rated from religious belief."° Again, this is significant since a
plaintiff could not sue a religious cult and present evidence of
brainwashing if the cult's conduct was held to be entirely pro-
tected by the Constitution.
The plaintiffs, in support of their brainwashing theory,
sought to introduce testimony from two experts on coercive
persuasion and its use by groups such as the Church. The
expert witnesses were Dr. Margaret Singer, a psychologist, and
Dr. Samuel Benson, a psychiatrist.' Both were expected to
testify that they believed the Church's "sophisticated indoc-
trination techniques" had caused the plaintiffs' incapacity to
exercise free will, judgment or independent response upon
learning of the deception used in their recruitment."2 Both
the trial court and the court of appeal held that the doctors'
testimony was inadmissible based on the fact that it conflicted
with the plaintiffs' testimony and would cause a violation of
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."'
The California Supreme Court disagreed with the lower
courts as to the admissibility of Singer and Benson's expert tes-
timony. The court stated that "[a]lthough the Singer and
Benson declarations provide a scientific basis for and lend
support to [the] plaintiffs' brainwashing theory, we find that
the basic theory is amply stated in [the] plaintiffs' own
declarations. " " The court's rationale was that both plaintiffs
had stated that they felt they had lost the ability to act inde-
pendently and freely choose or decide on their own. They
98. Molio, 762 P.2d at 59460.
99. Id. at 60.
100. Id. at 61-65.
101. Id. at 55.
102. Id.
103. Id. Neither court held that the evidence was inadmissible based on Feder-
al Rule of Evidence 702 or the Fiye standard.
104. Molko, 762 P.2d at 55.
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described themselves as having been manipulated both psycho-
logically and emotionally and as having been rendered
"robot-like.""3 While the California Supreme Court has been
supportive of such expert testimony, not all courts have been
as willing to allow brainwashing- related testimony, as will be
discussed below in connection with the decision of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California in
United States v. Fishman."°
C. The Proof Problem
1. Federal Rule of Evidence 702
Federal Rule of Evidence 702-Testimony by Experts,
reads as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or other-
wise."7
Rule 702 adopted the long-held position that:
The true test of the admissibility of such testimony is not
whether the subject matter is common or uncommon, or
whether many persons or few have some knowledge of the
matter; but it is whether the witnesses offered as experts
have any peculiar knowledge or experience, not common
to the world, which renders their opinions founded on
such knowledge or experience any aid to the court or the
jury in determining the questions at issue."
This rule is significant with respect to the admissibility of
expert testimony in brainwashing cases because expert witness-
es are of vital importance in demonstrating that coercive per-
suasion has occurred and in describing its effects. There may
not be any outward evidence apparent to a layperson that an
105. Id. at 55 n.12.
106. 743 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Cal. 1990). See infra notes 126-45 and accompany-
ing text.
107. FED. R. EVID. 702. See also 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702-1 (1991).
108. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL
228-29 (2d ed. 1987).
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individual has been brainwashed; an expert is required to de-
termine if and to what extent brainwashing has occurred. If
testimony relating to such persuasion is not deemed to be
admissible, then the plaintiff will have the extremely difficult, if
not impossible, task of proving that the brainwashing has oc-
curred.
2. Relevant Case Law
a. United States v. Amaral
In United States v. Amaral,"° which was used by the
Fishman court to interpret Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a
four-part test was developed to determine the admissibility of
expert testimony. In order to be admissible, the testimony
must: (1) come from a qualified expert, (2) be of a proper
subject, (3) conform to a generally accepted explanatory theo-
ry, and (4) have probative value that exceeds its prejudicial
effect."' In addition, the Fishman court cited United States v.
Gwaltney, which stated that "[t]he proponent of expert testimo-
ny has the burden of laying a proper foundation showing the
underlying scientific basis and reliability of the testimony.""'
Therefore, according to Amaral and Gwaltney, if the testimony
of an expert witness can meet the four-part test and be shown
to be reliable, then it is admissible under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702.
b. The Frye Test
Frye v. United States"' has long been the standard for the
admissibility of scientific evidence. Frye involved a murder
prosecution in which the defendant attempted to admit expert
testimony involving the use of a systolic blood pressure decep-
tion test, an ancestor of today's polygraph test."' The court
109. 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
110. Id. at 1153. Although the Amaral case does not specifically mention Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 702, the Fishman court views the Ftye standard and the
four-part test set forth in Amaral as necessary principles to determine "the admissi-
bility of expert testimony from mental health professionals." United States v.
Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713, 716 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
111. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. at 716 (citing United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d
1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1986)).
112. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
113. A polygraph test is a lie detector test. One psychologist, David Lykken,
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held that the evidence was inadmissible because "while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from
a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs.""' Since the systolic blood pressure de-
ception test had not yet been generally accepted by the scien-
tific community, the court could not allow testimony "from the
discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.""'
For many years, the Frye standard was almost blindly fol-
lowed by courts, although the standard was initially only ap-
plied to tangible, mechanical components."6 However, the
Frye standard was eventually applied to such intangible con-
cepts such as hypnotic and drug induced testimony,"' psy-
believes that several million polygraph tests are given each year. The polygraph
machine measures the amount of perspiration, rate of breathing, heart rate and
blood pressure. The basic idea is that any or all of these factors will increase if
an individual is lying. The subject's physiological state when relaxed is compared
to his or her physiological response to a question that is emotionally charged. The
person giving the polygraph test will ask three types of questions: nonemotional
("What is your address?"), emotional but irrelevant to the investigation ("Have you
ever been unfaithful to your spouse?"), and questions specifically relating to the
investigation ("Did you steal money from your place of employment?"). Some com-
mentators believe that it is possible to outsmart a polygraph test by visualizing
sexual acts, contracting muscles or self-infliction of pain (for example, putting a
tack in your shoe and stepping on it as you respond to each question) so that
the response to all questions will indicate physiological arousal and, therefore the
results will be inconclusive. JAMES HASSETr, UNDERSTANDING PSYCHOLOGY 155-57
(3d ed. 1980).
114. Ftye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added). See infra note 148 and accompany-
ing text.
115. Id. It bears noting at this point that the court's emphasis is on the ma-
chine, that is, does it work?
116. In California, the Frye standard has been applied to voice print analysis,
polygraph tests, blood tests to establish paternity, and hypnotically-induced testi-
mony. Steven M. Garrett, Comment, People v. Murtishaw: Applying the Frye Test to
Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Cases, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1069, 1085
(1982) (citing People v. Shirley, 641 P.2d 775 (Cal. 1982); People v. Kelly, 549
P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976); Huntingdon v. Crowley, 414 P.2d 382 (Cal. 1966);
People v. Wochnick, 219 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)). In addition, Reed v.
State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978) lists several areas which have been subjected
to the Frye "general acceptance" standard, e.g. paraffin tests, breath analysis, blood
tests, gunshot residue tests, and ink identification tests.
117. EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 606 (3d ed. 1984)
For more information concerning drugs and hypnosis, see id. at 631-34 and ac-
companying notes.
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chological profiles of battered women," rape trauma
syndrome. and, in Fishman, to brainwashing.'"
Recently, however, the Frye standard has been criticized,
limited, modified, rejected, and even ignored. Some courts
have concluded that the Frye standard goes to the weight of
evidence rather than to its admissibility.' Other courts have
determined that the standard only applies to scientific tests
themselves, or to the principles or methodology related there-
to, and not to the studies or results based thereon."
Supporters of the Frye standard applaud it because they
believe that it assures the uniformity of evidence, shields juries
from a tendency to treat scientific evidence as infallible, avoids
the expense (in time and money) of litigation, and insulates
the courts from what judges deem to be novel and unproven
evidence.' However, those opposed to the Frye standard be-
lieve that the same objectives can be met in other ways; for
example, that the witness's expertise and the relevancy of the
evidence should control.'24 This method of evaluation would
eliminate the problems of interpreting what constitutes
"general acceptance" and what community must be measured
for acceptance.'
c. United States v. Fishman
In United States v. Fishman,"6 the United States District
118. For information concerning "battered women's syndrome" see CLEARY ET
AL., supra note 117, at 635 n.91, and JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MA-
TERIALS ON EVIDENCE 394 (7th ed. 1988). See also infra note 208 and accompany-
ing text.
119. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 117, at 606. For further information concern-
ing rape trauma syndrome, see id. at 635 n.92 and JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 394-96 (7th ed. 1988).
120. United States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
121. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 117, at 606.
122. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 117, at 606.
123. CLEARY ET AL., supra, note 117, at 607. See, e.g., Clifford A. Knaggs, Com-
ment, The Admissibility of Evidence and Expert Testimony Based on Science, Technology
or Other Specialized Knowledge-Is the "Frye" Standard Consistent with the Federal Rules
of Evidence?, 4 COOLEY L. REV. 641 (1987) ("Frye should not fade away, but should
be held high and applauded.").
124. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 117, at 608. For a more detailed discussion of
the applicability of alternative tests, see discussion infra notes 162-88 and accompa-
nying text.
125. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 117, at 608.
126. 743 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Cal. 1990). The court states that "[t]he issue of
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Court for the Northern District of California dealt a fatal blow
to the admissibility of expert testimony in brainwashing-related
cases. This case involved a defendant who was indicted on
eleven counts of mail fraud, and who had defrauded various
district courts by fraudulently obtaining judgments through
shareholder class action suits. The defendant, Steven Fishman,
intended to rely on an insanity defense, claiming that brain-
washing by the Church of Scientology was to blame for his
state of mind when the offenses occurred. 2  Dr. Margaret
whether or not the proffered testimony [regarding brainwashing] in this case sat-
isfies the Frye test is not one of first impression among the federal courts. In
Kropinski v. World Plan Executive Council-U.S., 853 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1988)-the
Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the trial court for permitting Dr. Singer
to testify on coercive persuasion." Id. at 718. While the Kropinski court stated that
there was not general acceptance of Dr. Singer's theory, the testimony was not
admitted due to an incomplete record. Id. at 719.
It bears noting that in Fishman, the criminal defendant was trying to use a
theory of brainwashing to support an insanity defense. In Molko, however, the
plaintiffs were stating a civil cause of action based on brainwashing. Even though
Fishman is a criminal case, it still has the effect of permanently impeaching expert
witnesses on brainwashing, such as Dr. Singer, for all cases, since their views are
not "generally accepted."
127. Id. at 715. The Church of Scientology has been called a "hugely profit-
able global racket that survives by intimidating members and critics in a Mafia-like
manner." Richard Behar, The Thriving Cult of Greed and Power, TIME, May 6, 1991,
at 50. The Church of Scientology ("TCS") was originally founded by L. Ron
Hubbard, a science fiction writer, to "clear" people's minds of unhappiness. TCS
boasts 700 "religious" centers in 65 countries and "members" include Tom Cruise,
John Travolta, Kirstie Alley, Mimi Rogers, Anne Archer, Sonny Bono, Chick Corea
and Nancy Cartwright (voice of Bart Simpson). Id. Cynthia Kisser, executive direc-
tor of the Cult Awareness Network, has said, "[s]cientology is quite likely the most
ruthless, the most classically terroristic, the most litigious and the most lucrative
cult the country has ever seen. No cult extracts more money from its members."
Id. at 51. Vicki Aznaran, who was a key leader of TCS until 1987 said, "It makes
Jim and Tammy [Bakker] look like kindergarten." Id. at 51.
Ron Hubbard wrote the "Bible" of TCS, Dianetics: The Modern Science of
Mental Health, in 1950. In his book, Hubbard discusses the theory of "auditing," a
psycho-therapeutic technique, and presents a simplified lie detector test to detect
mental aberrations which cause unhappiness (labeled "engrams"). Allegedly, coun-
seling sessions can eliminate the engrams and the corresponding unhappiness, and
also "cure blindness and even improve a person's intelligence and appearance."
Richard Behar, The Thriving Cult of Greed and Power, TIME, May 6, 1991, at 50,
51. "Psychiatrists say that these sessions can produce a drugged-like,
mind-controlled euphoria that keeps customers coming back for more." Id. at 52.
The "Aims of Scientology" are "[a] civilization without insanity, without
criminals and without war, where the able can prosper and honest beings can
have rights, and where man is free to rise to greater heights." Supplement, The
Stoy that Time Couldn't Tell, USA TODAY, June 14, 1991, at 2. Scientologists say
that they abhor drugs and are self-proclaimed to be drug-free. TCS says that it "is
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the largest drug reform organization in the world and has so far gotten over
100,000 people off of street drugs. It has taken charge of the area of drug educa-
tion and prevention with such programs as 'Lead the Way To a Drug-Free USA.'"
Id.
The following is a suggested course of "enlightenment," with an estimate of
the time and the cost involved (the entire passage into an enlightened state is
estimated to cost from $200,000 to $400,000). There is some evidence that TCS
engages in a practice called "freeloader debt" for its members. In other words,
members get these services for a reduced fee, but are threatened with having to
pay "the difference between the full price normally charged to the public and the
price originally charged to the member" if they choose to leave TCS. Wollersheim
v. Church of Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331, 335 (Ct. App. 1989):
(1) Personality Test. Cost: free. Time: one hour. This is to
determine whether a person needs TCS and, apparently, no one is
turned away.
(2) Communications Courses. Cost: $250 each. Time: a few
weeks. The purpose of these courses is to "pacify and indoctrinate"
the client. One type of activity used in this phase is requiring a per-
son to sit in a chair for hours without moving.
(3) Regular Auditing (Grades 0-4). Cost: $500 per hour. Time:
indefinite. Goals are effective communication, elimination of problems,
and attainment of freedom from guilt and psychosomatic illnesses.
(4) New Era Dianetics. Cost: $500 per hour. Time: indefinite.
Goal is to attain the state of "clear."
(5) Clear Certainty Rundown. Cost: $2,800. Time: 5 hours.
Goal is to determine whether or not a person is really "clear."
(6) Operating Thetan (abbreviated O.T., this means that a per-
son is "at an advanced state of clear.") (Levels 1-2). Cost: $7,978.
Time: as many as 100 hours. Goal is to learn about ideas implanted
in man over 75 million years ago.
(7) O.T. (Levels 3-4). Cost: $17,010. Time: several months.
Goals are to study the "sacred scriptures" and to free oneself from
the effects of past-life drug use.
(8) O.T. (Levels 5-7). Cost: $25,600. Time: several months. Goal
is to locate and release body thetans (negative spiritual beings) that
have been dormant in a person for millions of years.
(9) O.T. (Level 8). Cost: $11,140 minimum. Time: a few weeks.
"The ultimate answer to everything," O.T. 8 is apparently offered
aboard TCS's yacht.
Richard Behar, The Thriving Cult of Greed and Power, TIME, May 6, 1991, at 52-53.
TCS is behind the war against Eli Lilly, a pharmaceutical company, and its
popular anti-depressant drug, Prozac. Id. at 53. It appears that if people take this
top-selling anti-depressant, then they will not need TCS.
TCS is also at war with its critics. Psychologist Margaret Singer, (see supra
notes 101-04 and accompanying text and infra notes 126-45 and accompanying
text), is an "outspoken Scientology critic and professor at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley, [who] now travels regularly under an assumed name to avoid ha-
rassment [by TCS]." Richard Behar, The Thriving Cult of Greed and Power, TIME,
May 6, 1991, at 50, 56. Mr. Richard Behar, who wrote, the TIME article, was in-
vestigated and harassed repeatedly after having written his article. Id. at 57.
According to the facts in Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 260 Cal.
Rptr. 331 (Ct. App. 1989), harassment is nothing new to the Church of
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Singer and Dr. Ofshe were expected to testify on behalf of the
defendant."'2
Dr. Singer was described by the court as "a well known
and highly regarded forensic psychologist"' and a "respect-
ed member of [her field].""s She was expected to testify that
the defendant was "incredibly suggestible [sic], compulsive and
Scientology. In Wollersheim, it was shown that TCS "engaged in a practice of retri-
bution and threatened retribution-often called 'fair game'-against members who
left or otherwise posed a threat to the organization." Id. at 335. The practice of
"fair game" apparently involved the attempt by Scientologists to "neutralize" a
person perceived to be a threat to TCS; such neutralization could be through
economic, political or psychological tactics. Id. at 336.
Even TIME magazine itself is being harassed for publishing its article. The
Reverend Heber C. Jentzsch, current president of TCS, called the TIME story "a
hatchet job." Howard Kurtz, Scientology Attacks Time with Ad Campaign, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, June 1, 1991, at 10C. TCS's ad campaign was launched the first
week of June, 1991 in USA TODAY and "focused on TIME'S coverage of Hitler and
Mussolini because TIME executives 'were wrong then and they're wrong now ....
These guys [TIME executives] are coming at us with a bully attack and now they're
unhappy about being exposed.'" Id. The ad campaign culminated on June 14,
1991 with a 27 -page USA TODAY supplement "[p]ublished as a public service by
the Church of Scientology International." Supplement, The Stoty that Time Couldn't
TeI4 USA TODAY, June 14, 1991. In the article, TCS accuses TIME, inter alia, of
(1) promoting the drug Prozac for its own economic gain (id. at 3-6), (2) publish-
ing lies in "the style of a supermarket tabloid" (id. at 7), (3) character assassina-
tion (id. at 8), (4) having a reputation of publishing "biased, antagonistic articles
against the Church" (id. at 9), (5) offending its readers with religious bigotry (id.),
(6) being the most successful liar of our times (id. at 12), and (7) being known as
"The Weekly Fiction Magazine" (id. at 13). This last point is particularly interest-
ing because on page 15 of the supplement, it is said that "Dianetics has sold over
14 million copies and appeared on The New York Times Bestseller List more than
93 times." Id. However, the graphics on this page show three fiction bestseller lists
from the New York Times, and Dianetics is not on any of them. The rest of the
supplement explains the views and accomplishments of TCS from the perspective
of the Scientologists. Id. at 19-27.
In addition, TCS seems to be a very litigious organization; it has filed 71
lawsuits against the Internal Revenue Service alone. Howard Kurtz, Scientology At-
tacks Time with Ad Campaign, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 1, 1991, at 10C.
TCS claims that it had nothing to do with Steven Fishman's actions in United
States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Mr. Fishman and his psychi-
atrist, Dr. Uwe Geertz, claim that when Mr. Fishman was arrested, he was ordered
by TCS to kill Dr. Geertz and then perform an 'end of cycle," which in TCS
jargon means to commit suicide. Richard Behar, The Thriving Cult of Greed and
Power, TIME, May 6, 1991, at 50, 55.
128. See discussion of Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World
Christianity, supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text and supra note 127.
129. United States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
130. Id. at 719. The court also refers to Dr. Singer as a "respected psycholo-
gist," and adds that this is 'a professional status with which the Court does not
quarrel." Id. at 717.
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obsessive," and that these qualities existed before he came into
contact with the Church of Scientology.' Dr. Singer would
also testify that the defendant's already weak psychological
state had deteriorated to the level of insanity as a result of his
contact with the Church of Scientology, and that the defendant
had become increasingly confused and delusional.
3 2
Dr. Ofshe was described by the court as a social psycholo-
gist holding a Ph.D. degree in sociology, and not a mental
health professional." The defendant presented Dr. Ofshe to
describe the method of coercive influence and behavioral con-
trol used by the Church of Scientology. According to Dr.
Ofshe, because of the influence of the Church, Mr. Fishman
did not know his acts were reprehensible or that the Church
had manipulated him for nearly ten years after he was initially
recruited."M Drs. Singer and Ofshe both believed that coer-
cive persuasion is possible and effective without the use or
threat of physical force.3 5
The government challenged the admissibility of the
Singer-Ofshe testimony on the grounds that their theories
concerning thought reform were not "generally accepted with-
in the applicable scientific community."' The district court
agreed and held that the evidence was inadmissible, citing the
Fye standard with approval.'37
The court reasoned that the application of the theory of
coercive persuasion to religious cults was relatively new and,
therefore, not generally accepted.'" The court received many
declarations, affidavits and letters from psychologists and soci-
ologists both supporting and criticizing the theory, which rein-
forced the Fishman court's view that the Singer-Ofshe theory
on brainwashing was not generally accepted. The court reject-
ed Dr. Singer's publication of an entry in the Merck Manual of
Diagnosis and Therapy, a well-known medical reference work on
131. Id. at 715.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 715-16.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 717.
136. Id. at 716.
137. Id. at 723.
138. Id. at 717.
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group psychodynamics, which included a discussion of reli-
gious cults, as an indication of general acceptance.'
The court cited as a "significant barometer of prevailing
views within the scientific community" certain professional
organizations such as the American Psychological Association
("APA") and the American Sociological Association ("ASA").
Since the court determined that neither the APA nor the ASA
endorsed the Singer-Ofshe theories, it held that their views
were not generally accepted.4  The court's barometer,
though, appears to be faulty because the record shows that nei-
ther the APA nor the ASA could agree as to what their views
were.'' If there is no consensus among the group, how can it
be used to measure acceptability?"'
In fact, the Fishman court discussed at length the general
acceptability of the evidence, but did not give a plausible test
for determining such acceptance. The court emphasized that
the defendant has the burden of proof but did not effectively
139. Id.
140. Id. at 717-18.
141. Id. For example, the APA named Dr. Singer to chair a task force to
study coercive persuasion and induction by deception. Before that task force had
finished its report, the APA endorsed a contrary position in an amicus brief filed
in the Molko case; the APA's view was that Dr. Singer's testimony should have
been excluded because "her coercive persuasion theory did not represent a mean-
ingful scientific concept." Id. at 718. It is interesting, then, that the APA had
named Dr. Singer to chair a task force on that very issue. The APA then with-
drew its name from the amicus brief after it had been filed with the California
Supreme Court. The APA claimed that its signature was withdrawn solely for pro-
cedural reasons, and that it had decided to wait for the report from Dr. Singer's
task force before endorsing any view on brainwashing. The APA'S motion to with-
draw as signatory stated that "the APA did not mean to suggest endorsement of
any views opposed to those set forth in the amicus brief, nor that it would ulti-
mately be able to subscribe to the views expressed in the brief." Id. at 718. The
Fishman court found it significant that the APA later rejected Dr. Singer's report
as "lack[ing] scientific merit," and stated that "the studies supporting its findings
lacked methodological rigor." Id. It seems, though, that this was not really very
significant in that the pendulum could have swung just as easily in the other di-
rection.
142. The psychological and social sciences seem to be full of differing views
and theories. Freud (see infra note 149), Piaget (see infra note 150), Maslow (see
infra note 151), Skinner (see infra note 153) and Pavlov (see supra note 25) all had
differing views, none of which may have been "generally accepted" by the respec-
tive community at the time they were proposed or at any time thereafter. Yet
each of these gentlemen was viewed as an expert in his field; this seems to be
the more logical test. It is useful to recall that it was not "generally accepted" that
the world was round when Columbus set out to find a new route to India.
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tell him how to meet that burden.' It seems that the
Fishman court thought that the defendant had a bad case for
brainwashing (because he had psychological problems before
he came into contact with the Church of Scientology) and thus
decided that the evidence would not be admissible. The court
recognized that Dr. Singer was very reputable, had much ex-
pertise in her area and that the APA named her to lead a task
force to study and prepare a report on deceptive and indirect
methods of persuasion and control'. but it adhered to the
Frye standard anyway. There are some very unfortunate conse-
quences of the Fishman decision: (1) qualified experts, such as
Dr. Singer, are disqualified from testifying in all brainwashing
cases since there is no general consensus among their peers,
and (2) plaintiffs such as those in Molko essentially will not
have a cause of action, since the testimony required to prove
the coercive persuasion element is not admissible. 5
III. ANALYSIS
A. Criticism of the Frye Standard
The Fishman court incorrectly applied the Fye standard to
the defendant's brainwashing-related testimony in order to
deny the admission of such evidence. The problem with the
Fishman court's application of the Fye standard to
psychology-related testimony46 is two-fold. First, the Frye stan-
dard is only appropriate to measure the admissibility of evi-
dence related to a mechanical or tangible component. Second,
by its nature any psychology-related testimony would rarely
meet the "generally accepted within the applicable scientific
143. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. at 717.
144. I.
145. This consequence has even further-reaching implications, since the admissi-
bility of evidence to prove undue influence, duress, adhesion contracts, and other
psychologically-related concepts would also be cast into doubt.
According to Professor Alan W. Scheflin, Santa Clara University Professor
of Law, there is evidence that the outcome of the Fishman case is a result of the
Church of Scientology's pressure and politics on the court. While this comment
examines only the faulty legal analysis of the Fishman case, the truth of the influ-
ence of extraneous forces would make the court's holding all the more absurd.
According to Professor Scheflin, who received the American Psychiatric
Association's 1991 Guttmacher Award for his book, Trance on Trial (1989), the
Fishman decision "is wrong in just about every respect."
146. See supra notes 126-45 and accompanying text.
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community" test that Frye requires and, consequently, plaintiffs
like Tracy Leal and David Molko would never have a cause of
action.
The Frye standard should only apply to tangible, mechani-
cal components which can be measured to a certain degree of
accuracy. The standard was originally devised in 1923 by the
District of Columbia Circuit Court to determine the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony related to the use of a systolic blood
pressure deception test. The court set forth the test as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is
difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evi-
dential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimo-
ny deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 147
The emphasis under the Frye standard was initially, and
has traditionally been,48 on a thing, a tangible and/or me-
chanical instrumentality and the expert's resulting interpre-
tation thereof. It therefore seems that the application of the
Frye standard to anything but a tangible component is an over-
extension of the rule and leads to the inappropriate exclusion
of evidence.
Due to the nature of psychological evidence (for example,
Dr. Singer's testimony in Fishman on brainwashing), such evi-
dence would rarely be deemed to be admissible under the Frye
standard. Very few, if any, psychological theories are generally
accepted by the applicable scientific community as required by
Frye. Nevertheless, the founders of those theories have been
viewed as experts based on their individual education, experi-
ence and other credentials. For example, Sigmund Freud,'41
147. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (emphasis add-
ed).
148. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye
v. United States, a Hay' Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1204-06; Steven M.
Garrett, Note, People v. Murtishaw: Applying the Frye Test to Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness in Capital Cases, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1085 (1982).
149. Sigmund Freud suggested that human personality is an energy system
driven by an unconscious component. Freud divided the mind into three compo-
nents: the id, ego, and superego. According to Freud, the id embodies a person's
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Jean Piaget,' ° Abraham Maslow,' Ivan Pavlov," and B.
F. Skinner" were all viewed as experts in their particular ar-
eas of study, even though their theories were not "generally ac-
cepted."
In addition, several criticisms that are generally made
against application of the Frye standard to physical apparatus
may also be made against the application of the standard to
brainwashing-related testimony. These criticisms point out the
weaknesses of the Frye standard as it was meant to be ap-
plied-to mechanical components, and show how these weak-
nesses would be even more evident when there exists no tangi-
ble apparatus to test. Criticisms of the Frye "general accep-
tance" standard have been grouped into five major catego-
ries.'"
unconscious instinctual or animal urges, and it seeks to satisfy those urges despite
any resulting consequences. The ego is primarily conscious and is realistic and
rational. The superego embodies a person's morality and conscience; it can create
internal conflicts and resulting guilt. Freud believed that a person's ego resolves
conflicts between the id (wants and desires) and the superego (morality and con-
science). JAMES HASSET", UNDERSTANDING PSYCHOLOGY 360-62 (3d ed. 1980).
150. Jean Piaget proposed four stages of cognitive development: (1) sensorimo-
tor stage-thinking is displayed in action, lasts from birth to two years; (2)
preoperational stage-symbolic representation begins, lasts from two years to six
years; (3) concrete operational stage-ability to consider conservation, several di-
mensions or features simultaneously, lasts from six years to twelve years; and (4)
formal operational stage-thought patterns become abstract and hypothetical, lasts
from twelve years through adulthood. Id. at 203.
151. Abraham Maslow, a humanistic psychologist, proposed a "hierarchy of
needs" which has three levels. Maslow believed that a person had to satisfy basic
needs before that individual could reach his or her full potential. The needs iden-
tified by Maslow, from the most basic, are:
Level 1-Fundamental Needs; includes physiological needs (hunger,
thirst, sex) and safety needs (feeling of security).
Level 2-Psychological Needs; includes belongingness and love needs
(acceptance) and esteem needs (achievement, competence, recogni-
tion).
Level 3-Self-Actualization Needs; an individual's need to reach his or
her full potential. Maslow believed that relatively few people ever
reach this level.
lId at 150-51.
152. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
153. B. F. Skinner believed that human behavior is shaped by rewards and
punishments, which either positively or negatively reinforce an individual's behav-
ior. JAMES HASSETT, UNDERSTANDING PSYCHOLOGY 367-69 (3d ed. 1980).
154. John D. Borders, Jr., Fit to be Fiyed: Fye v. United States and the Admissibil-
ity of Novel Scientific Evidence, 77 KY. L.J. 849, 860-62 (1989).
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The first criticism made is that courts have not consistent-
ly determined which categories of evidence must meet the Frye
standard. Second, there has been increasing difficulty in
determining the applicable scientific field, as many scientific
principles may overlap into more than one field."
A third criticism is that the term "general acceptance" is
ambiguous and vague, and that there has been no determina-
tion as to what percentage of acceptance is required from the
members of a given scientific field. This consideration is
significantly relevant to the Fishman case, as there was no con-
sensus among the members of either the American Psychologi-
cal Association or the American Sociological Association as to
any particular view of coercive persuasion. 8 The question
becomes, then, what percentage of consensus is required for
"general acceptance?"
Additionally, the application of the Frye standard is said to
be too conservative since it results in the exclusion of "reliable
and often outcome-determinative evidence," as the court will
be behind the times if it waits for evidence to become "gener-
ally accepted." 9 This criticism is of particular significance as
it relates to psychological testimony which may take a long
time to gain general acceptance.
Finally, it is said that the Frye standard clouds other more
critical issues with respect to the evidence in question. For
example, the relevancy of the evidence or the problems of use
155. Id. at 860 (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of
Scientqfic Evidence-A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientfic Evidence, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 261, 264-65 (1981-82)).
156. Id. (citing Imwinkelried, supra note 155, at 265 and Paul C. Giannelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Ftye v. United States, a Half.Centuty Later, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1208 (1980)). See also United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431,
438 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) ("Acceptance in the scientific
community is a nebulous concept."); Cornett v. State, 450 N.E.2d 498 (Ind. 1983);
People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
157. Borders, supra note 154, at 860-61 (citing Imwinkelried, supra note 154 at
265; 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 5168 at 87 (1978); Giannelli, supra note 156 at 1210-11).
158. See United States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713, 719 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
159. Borders, supra note 154, at 861 (citing lmwinkelried, supra note 155, at
265). See also Ciannelli, supra note 156, at 1224 ("'he critics who argue that the
Frye standard is too conservative are saying, in effect, that the general acceptance
standard works too well-it excludes much that is reliable along with that which is
unreliable. Interestingly, many commentators have overlooked instances in which
Frye does not work.").
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of a scientific technique may be overlooked in the consider-
ation of general acceptance."
It seems unjust to deny the admissibility of such psycho-
logical evidence and, consequently, to deny a plaintiffs cause
of action or to negate a defendant's defense solely because a
theory under which an expert is testifying is not "generally
accepted." Because the Frye rule was intended to apply only to
tangible components and because the application of the stan-
dard would lead to the unfair exclusion of relevant evidence,
another standard should apply to determine the admissibility
of psychological testimony.
16 1
B. Possible Alternatives to Frye
There are several alternative standards which could be
utilized to determine the admissibility of brainwashing-related
expert testimony while still meeting the requirements of Feder-
al Rule of Evidence 702.16 In addition, these alternatives
would continue to further certain objectives which supporters
of the Frye standard believe to be important: consistency and
uniformity of evidence and avoidance of complex litigation
6
without having the harsh effect of denying admission of rele-
160. Borders, supra note 154, at 861-62 (citing Giannelli, supra note 156, at
1226). See infra note 168 and accompanying text for a discussion relating to why
this is unacceptable to some commentators. For a discussion of the advantages
and disadvantages of the Ftye standard as it applies to physical apparatus, see
generally Ronald J. Bretz, Scientific Evidence and the Frye Rule: The Case for a Cau-
tious Approach, 4 COOLEY L. REv. 506 (1987); Borders, supra note 154; Giannelli,
supra note 156.
161. For an argument that the Fiye standard should apply to psychology-related
testimony, see Steven M. Garrett, Comment, People v. Murlishaw: Applying the Frye
Test to Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Cases, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1069,
1070 (1982) ("[T]he court should have held that expert predictions of dangerous-
ness will be inadmissible in the penalty phase of a capital trial until they meet 
the
Fye test for the admissibility of scientific evidence."). It is important to note at
this point that the standards of admissibility that are proposed in this comment
are intended to apply to plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases. Criminal prosecu-
tion and capital lawsuits are not addressed in any detail in this comment. For 
an
argument that the Frye standard should apply in capital cases, see id. at 1087-90.
162. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text. It is also interesting at this
point to note that Rule 702 does not incorporate the Ftye general acceptance
standard, and the Advisory Committee's Note does not even refer to Flye.
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 107, at 702-36. "The silence of the rule and 
its
drafters may arguably be regarded as tantamount to an abandonment of the gen-
eral acceptance standard." Id.
163. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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vant evidence necessary to prove a plaintiff's brainwashing-
related cause of action.
One alternative approach to the admissibility of expert
testimony based on novel scientific evidence, which seems to
be gaining increasing support, is the "relevancy standard." This
approach is generally attributed to Professor Charles
McCormick," who calls this alternative "the most appeal-
ing."'" The relevancy standard eliminates some of the prob-
lems of the Frye rule, including defining the scope of "general
acceptance," determining what is subject to Fye, and selecting
the applicable scientific field for measuring acceptance." It
has been argued that this relevancy standard is codified in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 7
Professor McCormick describes the relevancy standard as
follows:
General scientific acceptance is a proper condition for
taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but it is not a suit-
able criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Any relevant conclusions supported by a qualified expert
witness should be received unless there are distinct rea-
sons for exclusion. These reasons are the familiar ones of
prejudicing or misleading the jury or consuming undue
amounts of time."
Innovative scientific evidence is treated no differently than
other evidence under the relevancy standard.'69 Professor
McCormick does suggest, however, that when "the nature of
the technique is more esoteric," as brainwashing-related testi-
mony may be perceived to be, then a "stronger showing of
probative value should be required. " "'° Factors used to deter-
mine such probative value include:
(1) the potential error rate in using the technique, (2) the
existence and maintenance of standards governing its use,(3) presence of safeguards in the characteristics of the
technique, (4) analogy to other scientific techniques whose
164. Giannelli, supra note 156, at 1203.
165. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 117, at 608.
166. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 117, at 608.
167. Giannelli, supra note 156, at 1204 n.39.
168. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 117, at 608.
169. Giannelli, supra note 156, at 1204.
170. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 117, at 609 (footnote omitted).
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results are admissible, (5) the extent to which the tech-
nique has been accepted by scientists in the field involved,
(6) the nature and breadth of the inference adduced, (7)
the clarity and simplicity with which the technique can be
described and its results explained, (8) the extent to which
the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury, (9) the
availability of other experts to test and evaluate the tech-
nique, (10) the probative significance of the evidence in
the circumstances of the case, and (11) the care with which
the technique was employed in the case.
17
,
The relevancy standard appears to have a two-prong test:
(1) probative value of the evidence and (2) expertise of the wit-
ness." In other words, under the relevancy approach, if the
evidence can be deemed to be relevant and the witness can be
demonstrated to be an expert based on qualifications, creden-
tials and experience, then the evidence is admissible.
Another possible standard by which admissibility of expert
testimony based on novel scientific evidence could be mea-
sured is the "reliability approach." Under this standard, gener-
al acceptance is indicative of the weight to be given to evi-
dence rather than as to whether the evidence is admissible or
not." The reliability approach is said to be an "equivalent to
the outright repudiation of the general acceptance stan-
dard."17
It has also been suggested that a less harsh "substantial
acceptance test" be applied to innovative scientific evidence in
lieu of the general acceptance standard."
75 The substantial ac-
ceptance test would be easier to satisfy, but it warrants many
of the same criticisms as Frye; "substantial" is even more vague
and ambiguous than "general," and the problem remains as to
which field one should look in order to measure substantial
acceptance.
171. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 117, at 609 n.3
6
. These factors, however,
would appear to be more relevant and applicable to techniques involving a physi-
cal apparatus.
172. CLEARY ET AL., supra note, 117 at 608.
173. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 117, at 606 (citing State v. Olivas, 267 P.2d
893 (Ariz. 1954); People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Ct. App. 1975); Jenkins v.
State, 274 S.E.2d 618, 619 (Ga. App. 1980)).
174. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 117, at 606 n.1
8
.
175. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 117, at 608 (footnote omitted).
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Another alternative is the "independent commissions and
expert tribunals" approach, 76 which has been called "a radi-
cal departure from present practice."'" Although there are
many variations on this theme, the basic concept is that a
group of experts would be designated to evaluate innovative
scientific techniques and determine the admissibility there-
of."' This approach eliminates some of the problems associat-
ed with Frye; the field used to measure "acceptability" is nar-
rowed considerably, and "general acceptance" is not required.
Only acceptance by the commission is required for admission
of the evidence. However, this approach has been criticized as
being "inconclusive" and "time-consuming.""
Some commentators have suggested that rather than
shielding the jury from evidence via the ultra-conservative Frye
standard, the court should instead rely on the function of thejudicial system."8 For example, cross-examination, opposing
expert testimony, jury selection, and jury instructions could be
used to reduce jury confusion.'
One proponent of this type of alternative has proposed a
sort of 'jury education program" to help jurors understand
and evaluate scientific evidence.' Under this approach, a
court could: (1) appoint neutral experts to give instructional
lectures to the jury, (2) allow jurors to question expert witness-
es during the proceedings, (3) permit note-taking by the jury
during expert testimony, (4) summarize expert testimony for
the jury, and (5) give jurors pre-trial reading assignments in
order to make the jurors familiar with the scientific evidence
to be presented at trial.' While this approach may "fosterjuror involvement and augment juror knowledge,""a it seems
176. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 156, at 1231; Borders, supra note 154, at
871.
177. Giannelli, supra note 156, at 1231.
178. Giannelli, supra note 156, at 1231.
179. Mark McCormick, Scientfic Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibili-
ty, 67 IowA L REv. 879, 906 (1982) (footnote omitted).
180. Steven M. Eqesdal, Note, The Ftye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach Contra-
veny: An Empirical Evaluation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1769, 1786 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1787-90.
183. Id. (footnotes omitted).
184. Id. at 1789.
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that it would be very costly and time-consuming, if not impossi-
ble for some jurors.
Finally, it has been proposed that an alternative to the Frye
standard is a shifting of the burden of proving reliability."
At the heart of this approach is that "[t]he prosecution in a
criminal case should be required to establish the validity of a
novel scientific technique beyond a reasonable doubt. Civil liti-
gants" and criminal defendants, 87 on the other hand,
should establish the validity of a novel technique by a prepon-
derance of the evidence." " General acceptance seems to re-
quire something beyond a preponderance of the evidence
(more likely than not) standard of proof.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Need for a New Standard
As previously discussed, the application of the Frye stan-
dard to brainwashing-related testimony leads to inequitable
results; a plaintiffs cause of action based on brainwashing
necessarily fails because the expert testimony required in proof
thereof cannot meet the general acceptance standard. Under
the Frye standard, plaintiffs such as David Molko and Tracy
Leal in Molko"' would not succeed in a cause of action
against the Church because the expert testimony required to
show fraud and deceit, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress related to brainwashing would not be admissible."
9
Consequently, the Church would be essentially immune from
lawsuits related to brainwashing brought by plaintiffs such as
Molko and Leal. As this is an extremely unacceptable result,
another standard must be applied to brainwashing-related psy-
chological testimony so that it is not impossible for expert
testimony related to such causes of action to be found admissi-
ble.
185. Giannelli, supra note 156, at 1245-50.
186. E.g., the plaintiffs in Molko.
187. E.g., the defendant in Fishman.
188. Giannelli, supra note 156, at 1248.
189. See supra notes 33-81 and accompanying text.
190. Such psychological testimony could rarely meet the Fye standard. See
discussion supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
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In Section III, this comment reviewed a number of alter-
native approaches to the admissibility of brainwashing-related
expert testimony.'"' The best resolution to the admissibility
issue presented herein lies in a combination of several of the
alternatives previously presented. To be feasible, a proposed
standard must (1) comply with Rule 702'" and (2) allow
brainwashing-related expert testimony to be admissible so that
plaintiffs such as those in Molko may proceed with a cause of
action based thereon.
B. Proposed Standard
1. Relevancy Standard
First of all, the two-prong test underlying the relevancy
standard would be more functional with respect to psychologi-
cal testimony than the Frye standard has proven to be. For
evidence to be admissible under the relevancy standard, it
must: (1) be relevant, and (2) come from a witness who has
expertise in the area in question. '
Illustrations of how the relevancy standard would yield
acceptable results can be shown by applying this standard to
the Molko and Fishman cases. It is apparent that the California
Supreme Court views the occurrence of brainwashing as rele-
vant in cases such as Molko; in that case the court recognized
that the plaintiffs' causes of action involved an element of
brainwashing and held that they should be given an opportuni-
ty to present evidence in support of their claims.'
In Fishman, however, brainwashing-related testimony was
probably not relevant. In that case, the defendant, Mr.
Fishman, intended to rely on a brainwashing defense against
charges of mail fraud and fraudulently obtaining judgments
through shareholder class action suits."5 However, Dr. Marga-
ret Singer was to testify on behalf of the defendant that he was
already in a weak psychological state before he came into con-
tact with the Church of Scientology, and also that the defen-
dant became insane as a result of his contact with that
191. See supra notes 146-88 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
193. See supra 164-72 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
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church." Dr. Singer characterized Mr. Fishman as being "in-
credibly suggestible, compulsive and obsessive," and as "a
strange and eccentric person before he came into contact with
the Church of Scientology."'97 In addition, Dr. Singer be-
lieved that Mr. Fishman's "suggestibleness [sic] is
long-standing, as is his peculiar behavior and bizarre reason-
ing. "1
The Fishman court rejected the brainwashing-related testi-
mony on the basis of the Frye standard. The problem that this
application presents has been discussed in detail in this com-
ment. A further issue presented by the Fishman case is the
relevancy of the brainwashing testimony as related to the
defendant's insanity defense. Since Mr. Fishman was already in
a weak psychological state before he came in contact with the
Church of Scientology, the brainwashing defense was not at all
convincing and probably not relevant to the case.
It would have been preferable for the Fishman court to
hold that in some cases brainwashing would be a persuasive
element (either as part of a cause of action or as a defense),
but not on the facts presented in Fishman, rather than to com-
pletely destroy the admissibility of the expert testimony in-
volved in coercive persuasion cases. The Fishman court needed
only to rule that brainwashing-related testimony was irrelevant
in that case, thus precluding that defendant's expert testimony
about brainwashing. Because of the peculiar facts of Fishman,
and because the Fye standard should not have been applied
due to the lack of a tangible, mechanical component which
could be tested for reliability, the holding in Fishman should
be viewed as an aberration rather than the rule.
Once the relevancy prong has been established, the sec-
ond prong of the relevancy approach mandates that the court
evaluate the expertise of the witness who is expected to testify.
Here, the court should consider the special knowledge, experi-
ence, qualifications and credentials of the expert witness. If the
expert witness demonstrates expertise in a field, then that
witness should be allowed to testify as to his or her theory,
even if that theory is not generally accepted, unless the court
196. See supra notes 128-45 and accompanying text.
197. United States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (empha-
sis in original).
198. Id.
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has valid reasons for exclusion.' After the expert's testimony
has been received, it is again up to the opposing party to at-
tempt to impeach the witness and/or contradict the testimony
given.
There appears to be no question as to Dr. Singer's exper-
tise.'0 The Fishman court stated that "Dr. Margaret Singer is
a well known and highly regarded forensic psychologist""'
and is a "respected psychologist (a professional status with
which the Court does not quarrel)."' Dr. Singer also wrote
an entry on group psychodynamics in which she also discussed
cults in the Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, a
well-known medical reference work. The Fishman court found
that this contribution helped to "establish [Dr. Singer's] cre-
dentials as a respected psychologist.""'3
The Fishman court indicated that "[a] more significant
barometer of prevailing views within the scientific community
is provided by professional organizations such as the American
Psychological Association ("APA") and American Sociological
Association ("ASA")." The court then pointed to the fact
"that neither the APA nor the ASA has endorsed the views of
Dr. Singer and Dr. Ofshe on thought reform.""' However,
when considering Dr. Singer's credentials rather than the gen-
eral acceptance of her theories, it bears noting that the APA
appointed Dr. Singer to head a task force "to study and pre-
pare a report on deceptive and indirect methods of persuasion
and control."' Accordingly, since Dr. Singer was viewed by
both the court and her peers as an expert and had ample ex-
perience and qualifications, she would be allowed to testify
under the relevancy standard, since the issue of whether her
199. "These reasons are the familiar ones of prejudicing or misleading the jury
or consuming undue amounts of time." CLEARY ET AL., supra note 117, at 608.
See also supra note 168 and accompanying text.
200. This discussion will focus on Dr. Singer's qualifications, as the testimony
of Dr. Ofshe was excluded on other grounds. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. at 722-23.
201. Id. at 715.
202. Id. at 717.
203. Id. The court cites Dr. Singer's work in THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNO-
SIS AND THERAPY (15th ed. 1987). See also supra note 139 and accompanying text.
204. United States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713, 717 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
205. Id.
206. 1d,
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views are generally accepted is irrelevant to the admissibility of
her testimony under that standard.
2. General Acceptance and Weight of Evidence
It is appropriate in brainwashing-related cases that if gen-
eral acceptance is to be considered at all, it should go to the
weight given to evidence and not to its admissibility."
7 It is
then the duty of the opposing party to contest or contradict
the theories and evidence presented. Along this same line of
reasoning, it is also possible that brainwashing could be de-
clared a scientifically reputable theory through legislative ac-
tion; that way the judiciary system could focus entirely on the
relevancy and weight of the evidence rather than questioning
the theory's general acceptability. 5
207. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
208. In the August 30, 1991 edition of The Recorder, an article described a
similar bill which would "make it easier to get expert testimony on the battered
women's syndrome into criminal proceedings." Bill Ainsworth, Bill Recognizes Abuse
Syndrome as Defense, THE RECORDER, Aug. 30, 1991, at 1-2. Assembly Bill 785 (the
"Eaves Bill") was at that time expected to pass the Senate and go to Governor
Pete Wilson for approval. Id. at 1. The Eaves Bill had already passed the Assem-
bly by a 68-to-9 vote. Id. Apparently, the only opponent to the bill was the Cali-
fornia District Attorneys Association. Id. "Supporters of the bill explain that the
legislation would declare the [battered women's] syndrome a scientifically reputable
theory. That would give judges less reason to question its general acceptability."
Id. at 2. Rebecca Isaacs, the legal program director for Battered Women's Alterna-
tives in Martinez, said that "[tihis would just allow all relevant evidence to be
admitted." Id.
The Eaves Bill was intended to:
[A]mend the state evidence code to allow expert testimony regarding
battered women's syndrome, including the physical emotional or men-
tal effects upon the beliefs, perceptions or behavior of
domestic-violence victims. Typically, a victim of the syndrome fails to
respond rationally to repeated battering by an intimate because, over
the course of the relationship, the victim comes to believe the vio-
lence is justified.
Id.
The Eaves Bill was approved by Governor Wilson on October 10, 1991. It reads
in its entirety as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 1107 is added to the Evidence Code, to read:(a)
In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible by either the pros-
ecution or the defense regarding battered women's syndrome, includ-
ing the physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, per-
ceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence, except when
offered against a criminal defendant to prove the occurrence of the
act or acts of abuse which form the basis of the criminal charge.
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3. Burden of Proof
Civil litigants and criminal defendants should have the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
relevancy of expert testimony and the expertise of the expert
witness testifying on their behalf, rather than having the court
rule on admissibility based on general acceptance.' This pro-
posed standard would be more just and equitable because it
would allow essential brainwashing-related testimony that was
relevant to the issue to be admitted if such testimony could
pass the two-prong relevancy test set forth above, rather than
rendering such testimony never admissible, as with the Frye
standard.
4. Compliance with Federal Rule of Evidence 702
The only remaining inquiry, then, is whether this pro-
posed standard of admissibility would also comply with Rule
702, which requires that (1) specialized knowledge assist the
trier of fact to understand evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, and that (2) an expert witness be qualified in the areas
of knowledge, skill, experience, training or education."' It
appears that the above proposed relevancy standard would
comply with Rule 702. The first prong of the relevancy ap-
(b) The foundation shall be sufficient for admission of this expert testimony
if the proponent of the evidence establishes its relevancy and the proper qual-
Viications of the expert witness. Expert opinion testimony on battered women's
syndrome shall not be considered a new scientific technique whose reliability
is unproven.
(c) For purposes of this section, "abuse" and "domestic violence" are
defined as provided in Section 542 of the Code of Civil Procedure
for purposes of the Domestic Violence Protection Act.
(d) This section is intended as a rule of evidence only and no sub-
stantive change affecting the Penal Code is intended. The Legislature
does not intend Section 1107 of the Evidence Code to preclude the
admissibility of evidence of battered women's syndrome under other
statutory or case law.
The new evidence code section cited above adopts the relevancy standard and
declares the reliability of expert testimony concerning battered women's syndrome.
Brainwashing and battered women's syndrome have been subject to the same criti-
cisms under the Ftye standard. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. It
seems that if such legislation is possible for battered women's syndrome, it should
also be available for other psychological theories such as brainwashing.
209. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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proach, that the testimony be relevant to the issues of the case,
would ensure that the expert's testimony would assist the trier
of fact. It seems that brainwashing can only be proven by ex-
pert testimony. Therefore, if the testimony of a witness is rele-
vant to brainwashing and the witness is an expert, then certain-
ly the testimony would, in fact, assist the trier of fact. The
second prong of the relevancy approach, the expertise inquiry,
would demonstrate whether or not the expert is qualified.
To take this inquiry a step further, the Fishman court sug-
gested that for expert testimony to be admissible under Rule
702, it must (1) come from a qualified expert, (2) be of proper
subject, (3) conform to generally accepted explanatory theory,
and (4) have probative value that exceeds it prejudicial ef-
fect.2" The Fishman court further required that the party on
whose behalf the expert would testify has the burden of prov-
ing that such testimony is reliable.' It appears that the pro-
posed relevancy standard of admissibility meets all of these re-
quirements except for the conformity to a generally accepted
explanatory theory. The proposed standard would demonstrate
both that the expert was qualified (expertise prong), and that
the evidence was of a proper subject (relevancy prong). Once
the two prongs of the proposed test are met, the court should
allow the witness to testify unless the evidence is prejudicial or
misleading,"' thus satisfying the probative value requirement.
The proposed standard places the burden of proving the rel-
evancy and expert witness qualification on the party on whose
behalf the witness is expected to testify.
The proposed standard does not meet the general accep-
tance requirement imposed by the Fishman court. This com-
ment has discussed the reasons for abandonment of the gener-
al acceptance standard: (1) the Frye standard should only apply,
if it should apply at all, to tangible, mechanical components,
(2) the Fye standard presents many problems in its applica-
tion, including the exclusion of relevant and perhaps
outcome-determinative evidence and the denial of causes of
action for brainwashing-related cases, and (3) Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 makes no mention of a general acceptance stan-
211. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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dard 4 For these reasons, the general acceptance test is not
an appropriate element in assuring the compliance of an ad-
missibility standard with Rule 702. For the above reasons, it
appears that the relevancy standard proposed herein satisfies
the requirements of Rule 702 and is a suitable standard to
measure the admissibility of expert testimony relating to coer-
cive persuasion cases.
5. Summary of Proposed Standard
The standard that this comment proposes, then, is as fol-
lows: (1) if general acceptance is considered at all, it should go
to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility; and
(2) civil litigants and criminal defendants will have the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence (a) that the
expert testimony is relevant and (b) that the expert witness has
expertise in the area in question.
V. CONCLUSION
This comment has discussed the history of brainwashing
and current views on the admissibility of testimony regarding
coercive persuasion. Specifically, it explored the controversy
between Molko, which allows a cause of action for
brainwashing-related conduct, and Fishman, which holds that
the evidence required to prove such a cause of action is inad-
missible. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was discussed with re-
spect to requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony.
The problems of the Frye standard were addressed, and several
alternative standards were outlined. Finally, a new standard of
admissibility, which draws from several sources and complies
with Rule 702, was proposed.
Applying the standard of admissibility proposed in this
comment would resolve the controversy between allowing a
cause of action in brainwashing-related cases and the admissi-
bility of the requisite expert testimony. Rejection of the Frye
general acceptance standard is necessary so that plaintiffs who
are coercively persuaded by religious cults may successfully
assert causes of action against those entities. Otherwise, reli-
gious cults will be essentially immune from tort liability in suits
214. See supra note 162.
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related to brainwashing. The proposed relevancy standard
must be adopted by the courts in order to maintain equity and
justice in cases involving coercive persuasion.
Virginia M. Fournier

